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Peña-Guzmán’s (2017) discussion of suicide in nonhuman animals has potential implications for 
theories of suicide, the understanding of nonhuman behavioral capacities, and even concepts of 
personhood. In this commentary, I focus on a key issue that underscores the difficulty of 
determining what “counts” as suicide in nonhuman animals, namely, the logical relation between 
suicide and intention. I extend Peña-Guzmán’s article by considering the need to distinguish 
proximate cause from ultimate (evolutionary) function in explanations of suicide. I then consider 
two adaptationist accounts of suicidal behavior and discuss their relevance for Peña-Guzmán’s 
argument. 
Peña-Guzmán discounts the definitional importance of intention in suicide by arguing that 
free will is a thorny topic with metaphysical baggage and that intention is often understood in 
causal/mental-representational terms. Let’s step back though and consider whether it would 
make sense to state that a human (or nonhuman) animal accidentally committed suicide. I suggest 
that this would be a very odd use of language; if the action was not intentional, we would not 
consider it suicide. The ontology of free will notwithstanding, this speaks to the role of intention 
in the application of the concept of suicide (see also commentary by Preti, 2018). As Peña-Guzmán 
notes, however, intention need not be construed as a causal prior “internal” event; the work of 
Leavens and colleagues, for example (Leavens, Bard, & Hopkins, 2017, see also, Leavens, Racine, 
& Hopkins, 2009), which Peña-Guzmán cites, is a reminder that the so-called representational 
theory of mind is but one framework for making sense of human and nonhuman behaviors. 
However, pointing this out does not make intention independent of suicidality. Rather, it invites 
us to consider behavioral grounds when making attributions of intentionality; the potential 
mistake would be seeing intention as having to be some sort of prior mental act, or the like. 
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   Peña-Guzmán’s discussion of the parallels between human and nonhuman self-
destructive behavior seems to skate around this central issue of intentionality. Given that an 
implication of his target article is the evolutionary continuity of suicidal behavior, a more direct 
way to make this case might be to consider the ultimate function of suicide. As Peña-Guzmán 
notes, evolutionary theories have been used to explain self-harm behaviors in nonhuman animals, 
often without reference to suicide. For example, an implication of inclusive fitness theory is that 
one will sacrifice one’s life if it would benefit the reproductive prospects of those with whom one 
shares genes. Although this might explain the adaptive function of self-sacrifice, it cannot, as 
Peña-Guzmán remarks, distinguish suicidal from nonsuicidal behaviors and is therefore of limited 
relevance in the present discussion. It also runs afoul of the intentionality criterion mentioned 
earlier. After all, as Peña-Guzmán (p. 8, emphasis original) remarks, “there is a difference between 
how we explain the behavior and what we call it.” It is also important to recognize that appeals 
to proximate and ultimate cause should not be understood as competing explanations of a 
behavior (MacDougall-Shackleton, 2011). 
Attributing an ultimate function for a behavior typically amounts to the claim that the 
behavior was adaptive in some ancestral context. As noted, appeals to inclusive fitness (or, 
derivatively, kin selection) are not sufficient on their own; what is needed is an adaptationist 
account of suicidality proper. If such an account existed and were plausible, then it could be 
applied to human and nonhuman animals, supporting the Darwinian continuity that Peña-
Guzmán argues for in his target article. 
Given that suicide is relatively common and heritable in humans (for a review, see Turecki, 
2001), we can presume it has a potential adaptive function and we can go on to test various 
adaptationist hypotheses. Indeed, different adaptationist accounts have been advanced to 
explain its prevalence in humans. De Catanzaro (1995), for example, points out that suicide occurs 
at a higher rate when individuals are less likely to reproduce and more likely to be a burden to 
their families. Evoking inclusive fitness, de Catanzaro argues that these individuals are also less 
able to promote their genes (see also commentary by Preti, 2018). An alternative (but not 
necessarily competing) hypothesis has been put forward by Tanaka and Kinney (2011), who argue 
that the evolutionary function of suicide is to reduce the risk of transmitting infections to kin. 
Their evidence is that immune dysfunction increases the likelihood of experiencing negative 
mental health outcomes associated with suicide and that suicide is more common in occupations 
associated with immune dysfunction. 
Although either, or both, of these hypotheses might capture something of the ancestral 
condition of anatomically modern humans, they leave open the question of whether these 
explanations would automatically support the continuity thesis. Given the definitional concerns 
mentioned earlier, the actual proximate suicidal act, whatever its evolutionary function, must 
presumably be intended by the actor. Since evoking intention need not evoke causally prior 
representational capacities, it is here that human “theory of mind” capacities might be required 
for behavior to be considered suicidal. 
As Peña-Guzmán notes, great apes do pass mirror self-recognition tests. However, mirror 
self-recognition indexes a fairly limited mentality. Although chimpanzees have been shown to 
understand intentions in competitive situations, they do not seem to understand intentions in 
general (e.g., Tomasello, 2014). For this reason, among others, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
many of the examples of suicide in nonhuman animals are anecdotal. Although there are clear 
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instances of animals engaging in self-harming behaviors, none clearer perhaps than alarm calling 
in vervet monkeys, there are few unambiguous examples of self-directed lethal behaviors. 
Therefore, although I applaud Peña-Guzmán’s attempt to broaden the conceptual space for 
considering the possibility of suicide and injecting some Darwinian continuity into these 
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